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Abstract:
In multi-period stochastic optimization problems, the future optimal decision
is a random variable whose distribution depends on the parameters of the opti-
mization problem. We analyze how the expected value of this random variable
changes as a function of the dynamic optimization parameters in the context
of Markov decision processes. We call this analysis stochastic comparative
statics. We derive both comparative statics results and stochastic comparative
statics results showing how the current and future optimal decisions change in
response to changes in the single-period payoff function, the discount factor,
the initial state of the system, and the transition probability function. We ap-
ply our results to various models from the economics and operations research
literature, including investment theory, dynamic pricing models, controlled
random walks, and comparisons of stationary distributions.
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1 Introduction
A question of interest in a wide range of problems in economics and operations research is
whether the solution to an optimization problem is monotone with respect to its parame-
ters. The analysis of this question is called comparative statics.1 Following Topkis’ seminal
work (Topkis, 1978), comparative statics methods have received significant attention in
the economics and operations research literature.2 While comparative statics methods
are usually applied to static optimization problems, they can also be applied to dynamic
optimization problems. In particular, these methods can be used to study how the policy
function3 changes with respect to the current state of the system or with respect to other
parameters of the dynamic optimization problem.4 That is, for multi-period optimization
models, comparative statics methods can be used to determine how the current period’s
optimal decision changes with respect to the parameters of the optimization problem. For
example, in a Markov decision process, under suitable conditions on the payoff function
and on the transition function, comparative statics methods can be applied to show that
the optimal decision is increasing in the discount factor when the state of the system is
fixed. But since the model is dynamic and includes uncertainty, the states’ evolution is
different under different discount factors, and thus, it is not clear whether the future op-
timal decision is increasing in the discount factor even when the current optimal decision
is increasing in the discount factor for a fixed state.
The state of the system in period t > 1 is a random variable from the point of view
of period 1, and thus, the optimal decision in period t, which depends on the state of the
system in period t, is a random variable given the information available in period 1. In
this paper, we analyze how the expected value of the optimal decision in period t changes
as a function of the optimization problem parameters in the context of Markov decision
processes (MDP). We call this analysis stochastic comparative statics. More precisely,
let (E,) be a partially ordered set that contains some parameters of the MDP. For
1 See Topkis (2011) for a comprehensive treatment of comparative statics methods.
2 See for example LiCalzi and Veinott (1992), Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Athey (2002),
Echenique (2002), Antoniadou (2007), Quah (2007), Quah and Strulovici (2009), Shirai (2013), Nocetti
(2015), Wang and Li (2015), Barthel and Sabarwal (2018), and Koch (2019).
3Mu¨ller (1997) and Smith and McCardle (2002) study how the optimal value function changes with
respect to the parameters of the dynamic optimization problem, such as the single-period payoff func-
tion and the transition probability function. In contrast, in this paper, we analyze the optimal policy
function.
4 For comparative statics results in dynamic optimization models see Serfozo (1976), Lovejoy
(1987), Amir et al. (1991), Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992), Mirman et al. (2008), Topkis (2011),
Krishnamurthy (2016), Smith and Ulu (2017), Lehrer and Light (2018), and Dziewulski and Quah
(2019).
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example, E can be the set of all transition probability functions, the set of all discount
factors, and/or a set of parameters that influence the payoff function. Suppose that under
the parameters e ∈ E a stationary policy function is given by g(s, e) where s is the state of
the system. Given the policy function g and the system’s initial state, the system’s states
follow a stochastic process. Suppose that the states’ distribution in period t is described
by the probability measure µt(ds, e). We are interested in finding conditions that ensure
that the expected decision in period t, Et(g(e)) =
∫
g(s, e)µt(ds, e) is increasing in the
parameters e on E.
The expected value Et(g(e)) is interpreted in two different ways. From a probabilistic
point of view, Et(g(e)) is the expected optimal decision in period t as a function of the pa-
rameters e. For example, in investment theory, this expected value usually represents the
expected capital accumulation in the system in period t (Stokey and Lucas, 1989). In in-
ventory management, it represents the expected inventory in period t (Krishnan and Winter,
2010), and in income fluctuation problems it represents the expected wealth accumula-
tion (see Huggett (2004) and Bommier and Grand (2018)) in period t. From a deter-
ministic point of view, if we consider a population of ex-ante identical agents whose
states evolve independently according to the stochastic process that governs the states’
dynamics, then µt represents the empirical distribution of states in period t. In this case,
E
t(g(e)) corresponds to the average decision in period t of this population given the pa-
rameters e. This latter interpretation is common in the growing literature on stationary
equilibrium models and mean field equilibrium models. In this literature, while the fo-
cus is on the analysis of equilibrium, some stochastic comparative statics results have
been obtained (see Adlakha and Johari (2013) and Acemoglu and Jensen (2015)). These
stochastic comparative statics results are useful in analyzing the equilibrium of these mod-
els. In particular, proving comparative statics results and establishing the uniqueness of
an equilibrium (see Hopenhayn (1992), Light (2018b), Acemoglu and Jensen (2018), and
Light and Weintraub (2019)).
The goal of this paper is to provide general stochastic comparative statics results in
the context of an MDP. In particular, we provide various sufficient conditions on the
primitives of MDPs that guarantee stochastic comparative statics results with respect
to important parameters of MDPs, such as the discount factor, the single-period payoff
function, and the transition probability function. We also provide novel comparative
statics results with respect to these parameters. For example, we show that under a
standard set of conditions that implies that the policy function is increasing in the state,
the policy function is increasing the discount factor also (see Section 3.2). We apply our
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results in capital accumulation models with adjustment costs (Hopenhayn and Prescott,
1992), in dynamic pricing models with reference effects (Popescu and Wu, 2007), and in
controlled random walks. As an example, consider the following controlled random walk
st+1 = st + at + ǫt+1 where st is the state of the system in period t, at is the action
chosen in period t, and {ǫt}
∞
t=1 are random variables that are independent and identically
distributed across time. In each period, a decision maker receives a reward that depends
on the current state of the system and incurs a cost that depends on the action that the
decision maker chooses in that period. The reward function is increasing in the state
of the system and the cost function is increasing in the decision maker’s action. The
decision maker’s goal is to maximize the expected sum of rewards. We provide sufficient
conditions on the reward function and on the cost function that guarantee that the decision
maker’s current action and the expected future actions increase when the distribution of
the random noise ǫ is higher in the sense of stochastic dominance. Since our results
are intuitive and the sufficient conditions that we provide in order to derive stochastic
comparative statics results are satisfied in some dynamic programs of interest, we believe
that our results hold in other applications as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamic opti-
mization model. Section 2.1 presents definitions and notations that are used throughout
the paper. In Section 3.1 we present our main stochastic comparative statics results. In
Section 3.2 we study changes in the discount factor and in the single-period payoff func-
tion. In Section 3.3 we study changes in the transition probability function. In Section 4
we apply our results to various models. In Section 5 we provide a summary, followed by
an Appendix containing proofs.
2 The model
In this section we present the main components and assumptions of the model. For con-
creteness, we focus on a standard discounted dynamic programming model, sometimes
called a Markov decision process.5 For a comprehensive treatment of dynamic program-
ming models, see Feinberg and Shwartz (2012) and Puterman (2014).
We define a discounted dynamic programming model in terms of a tuple of elements
(S,A,Γ, p, r, β). S ⊆ Rn is a Borel set called the state space. B(S) is the Borel σ-algebra
on S. A ⊆ R is the action space. Γ is a measurable subset of S × A. For all s ∈ S,
5 All our results can be applied to other dynamic programming models, such as positive dynamic
programming and negative dynamic programming.
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the non-empty and measurable s-section Γ(s) of Γ is the set of feasible actions in state
s ∈ S. p : S×A×B(S) → [0, 1] is a transition probability function. That is, p(s, a, ·) is a
probability measure on S for each (s, a) ∈ S×A and p(·, ·, B) is a measurable function for
each B ∈ B(S). r : S × A→ R is a measurable single-period payoff function. 0 < β < 1
is the discount factor.
There is an infinite number of periods t ∈ N := {1, 2, ...}. The process starts at some
state s(1) ∈ S. Suppose that at time t the state is s(t). Based on s(t), the decision maker
(DM) chooses an action a(t) ∈ Γ(s(t)) and receives a payoff r(s(t), a(t)). The probability
that the next period’s state s(t+ 1) will lie in B ∈ B(S) is given by p(s(t), a(t), B).
Let H = S × A and H t := H × . . .×H︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−1 times
×S. A policy σ is a sequence (σ1, σ2, . . .) of
Borel measurable functions σt : H
t → A such that σt(s(1), a(1), . . . , s(t)) ∈ Γ(s(t)) for
all t ∈ N and all (s(1), a(1), . . . , s(t)) ∈ H t. For each initial state s (1), a policy σ and a
transition probability function p induce a probability measure over the space of all infinite
histories H∞.6 We denote the expectation with respect to that probability measure by
Eσ, and the associated stochastic process by {s(t), a(t)}
∞
t=1. The DM’s goal is to find a
policy that maximizes his expected discounted payoff. When the DM follows a strategy
σ and the initial state is s ∈ S his expected discounted payoff is given by
Vσ(s) = Eσ
∞∑
t=1
βt−1r(s(t), a(t)).
Define
V (s) = sup
σ
Vσ(s).
We call V : S → R the value function.
Define the operator T : B(S) → B(S) where B(S) is the space of all functions f :
S → R by
Tf(s) = max
a∈Γ(s)
h(s, a, f),
where
h(s, a, f) = r(s, a) + β
∫
S
f(s′)p(s, a, ds′). (1)
Under standard assumptions on the primitives of the MDP,7 standard dynamic program-
6 The probability measure on the space of all infinite histories H∞ is uniquely defined by the
Ionescu Tulcea theorem (for more details, see Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) and Feinberg (1996)).
7The state and action spaces can be continuous or discrete. When we discuss convex functions on S
we assume that S is a convex set.
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ming arguments show that the value function V is the unique function that satisfies
TV = V . In addition, there exists an optimal stationary policy and the optimal policies
correspondence
G(s) = {a ∈ Γ(s) : V (s) = h(s, a, V )}
is nonempty, compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous. Define g(s) = maxG(s). We
call g(s) the policy function. For the rest of the paper, we assume that the value function
is the unique and continuous function that satisfies TV = V , T nf converges uniformly to
V for every f ∈ B(S), and that the policy function exists.8
2.1 Notations and definitions
In this paper we consider a parameterized dynamic program. Let (E,) be a partially
ordered set that influences the DM’s decisions. We denote a generic element in E by e.
Throughout the paper, we slightly abuse the notations and allow an additional argument
in the functions defined above. For instance, the value function of the parameterized
dynamic program V is denoted by
V (s, e) = max
a∈Γ(s,e)
h(s, a, e, V ).
Likewise, the policy function is denoted by g(s, e); r(s, a, e) is the single-period payoff
function; and h(s, a, e, V ) is the h function associated with the dynamic program problem
with parameters e, as defined above in Equation (1). For the rest of the paper, we let Ep
be the set of all transition functions p : S × A× B(S)→ [0, 1].
When the DM follows the policy function g(s) and the initial state is s(1), the stochas-
tic process (s(t)) is a Markov process. The transition function of (s(t)) can be described
by the policy function g and by the transition function p as follows: For all B ∈ B(S),
define µ1(B) = 1 if s(1) ∈ B and 0 otherwise, and µ2(B) = p(s(1), g(s(1)), B). µ2(B)
is the probability that the second period’s state s(2) will lie in B. For t ≥ 3, define
µt(B) =
∫
S
p(s, g(s), B)µt−1(ds) for all B ∈ B(S). Then µt(B) is the probability that s(t)
will lie in B ∈ B(S) in period t when the initial state is s(1) ∈ S and the DM follows the
policy function g. For notational convenience, we omit the reference to the initial state.
All the results in this paper hold for every initial state s(1) ∈ S.
8These conditions are usually satisfied in applications. Conditions that ensure the existence and
continuity of the value function and the existence of a stationary policy function are widely stud-
ied in the literature. See Hinderer et al. (2016) for a textbook treatment. For recent results, see
Feinberg et al. (2016) and references therein.
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We write µti(B) to denote the probability that s will lie in B ∈ B(S) in period t, when
ei ∈ E are the parameters that influence the DM’s decisions and the DM follows the
policy function g(s, ei), i = 1, 2. For ei ∈ E, define
E
t
i(g(ei)) =
∫
S
g(s, ei)µ
t
i(ds).
As we discussed in the introduction, Eti(g(ei)) can be interpreted in two ways. According
to the first interpretation, the DM’s optimal decision in period t is a random variable
from the point of view of period 1. The expected value Eti(g(ei)) is the DM’s expected
decision in period t, given that the parameters that influence the DM’s decisions are
ei ∈ E. Alternately, the expected value E
t
i(g(ei)) can be interpreted as the aggregate of the
decisions of a continuum of DMs facing idiosyncratic shocks. In the latter interpretation,
each DM has an individual state and µt is the distribution of the DMs over the states
in period t. This interpretation is often used in stationary equilibrium models and in
mean field equilibrium models (see more details in Section 4.4). We are interested in
the following stochastic comparative statics question: is it true that e2  e1 implies
E
t
2(g(e2)) ≥ E
t
1(g(e1)) for all t ∈ N (and for each initial state)? We note that for t = 1,
the stochastic comparative statics question reduces to a comparative statics question: is
it true that e2  e1 implies g(s, e2) ≥ g(s, e1)?
We now introduce some notations and definitions that will be used in the next sections.
For two elements x, y ∈ Rn we write x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for each i = 1, ..., n. We say that
f : Rn → R is increasing if x ≥ y implies f(x) ≥ f(y).
Let D ⊆ RS where RS is the set of all functions from S to R. When µ1 and µ2 are
probability measures on (S,B(S)), we write µ2 D µ1 if
∫
S
f(s)µ2(ds) ≥
∫
S
f(s)µ1(ds)
for all Borel measurable functions f ∈ D such that the integrals exist.
In this paper we will focus on two important stochastic orders: the first order stochastic
dominance and the convex stochastic order. When D is the set of all increasing functions
on S, we write µ2 st µ1 and say that µ2 first order stochastically dominates µ1. If D is
the set of all convex functions on S, we write µ2 CX µ1 and say that µ2 dominates µ1 in
the convex stochastic order. If D is the set of all increasing and convex functions on S,
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we write µ2 ICX µ1. Similarly, for p1, p2 ∈ Ep, we write p2 D p1 if
∫
S
f(s′)p2(s, a, ds
′) ≥
∫
S
f(s′)p1(s, a, ds
′)
for all Borel measurable functions f ∈ D ⊆ RS and all (s, a) ∈ S × A such that the
integrals exist.9 If D is the set of all increasing functions, convex functions, and convex
and increasing functions, we write p2 st p1, p2 CX p1, and p2 ICX p1, respectively. For
comprehensive coverage of stochastic orders and their applications, see Mu¨ller and Stoyan
(2002) and Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007).
Definition 1 (i) We say that p ∈ Ep is monotone if for every increasing function f the
function
∫
S
f(s′)p(s, a, ds′) is increasing in (s, a).
(ii) We say that p ∈ Ep is convexity-preserving if for every convex function f the
function
∫
S
f(s′)p(s, a, ds′) is convex in (s, a).
(iii) Define Pi(s, B) =: pi(s, g(s, ei), B). Let D ⊆ R
S. We say that Pi is D-preserving
if f ∈ D implies that
∫
S
f(s′)Pi(s, ds
′) ∈ D. If D is the set of all increasing functions,
convex functions, and convex and increasing functions, we say that Pi is I-preserving,
CX-preserving, and ICX-preserving, respectively.
3 Main results
In this section we derive our main results. In Section 3.1 we provide stochastic comparative
statics results. In Section 3.2 and in Section 3.3 we provide conditions on the primitives of
the MDP that guarantee comparative statics and stochastic comparative statics results.
3.1 Stochastic comparative statics
In this section we provide conditions that ensure stochastic comparative statics. Our
approach is to find conditions that imply that the states’ dynamics generated under e2
stochastically dominate the states’ dynamics generated under e1 whenever e2  e1. Theo-
rem 1 shows that if P2 is D-preserving and P2(s, ·) D P1(s, ·) for all s ∈ S, then µ
t
2 D µ
t
1
for all t ∈ N. A proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Chapter 5 in Mu¨ller and Stoyan (2002)
where the authors study stochastic comparisons of general Markov chains. For complete-
ness, because our setting is slightly different, we provide the proof of Theorem 1 in the
9 In the rest of the paper, all functions are assumed to be integrable.
8
Appendix for completeness.10
The focus of the rest of the paper is on finding sufficient conditions on the primitives
of the MDP in order to apply Theorem 1. Corollary 1 and Theorem 2 provide sufficient
conditions for P2 to beD-preserving and P2(s, ·) D P1(s, ·) whenD is the set of increasing
functions or the set of increasing and convex functions. The results in this section require
conditions on the policy function and on the primitives of the MDP. In Sections 3.2 and
3.3, we provide comparative statics and stochastic comparative statics results that depend
only on the primitives of the model (e.g., the transition probabilities and the single-period
payoff function).
Theorem 1 Let (E,) be a partially ordered set and let D ⊆ RS. Let e1, e2 ∈ E and
suppose that e2  e1. Assume that P2 is D-preserving and that P2(s, ·) D P1(s, ·) for all
s ∈ S. Then µt2 D µ
t
1 for all t ∈ N.
In the case that p2 = p1 = p and (E,) is a partially ordered set that influences
the agent’s decisions, Theorem 1 yields a simple stochastic comparative statics result.
Corollary 1 shows that if g(s, e) is increasing in e, g(s, e2) is increasing in s, and p is
monotone, then Et2(g(e2)) ≥ E
t
1(g(e1)) whenever e2  e1. This result is useful when E is
the set of all possible discount factors between 0 and 1, or is a set that includes parameters
that influence the single-period payoff function (see Section 3.2).
Corollary 1 Let e1, e2 ∈ E and suppose that e2  e1. Assume that g(s, e) is increasing
in e for all s ∈ S, g(s, e2) is increasing in s, p1 = p2 = p, and p is monotone. Then
E
t
2(g(e2)) ≥ E
t
1(g(e1))
for all t ∈ N and for each initial state s(1) ∈ S.
In some dynamic programs we are interested in knowing how a change in the initial
state will influence the DM’s decisions in future periods. Corollary 2 shows that a higher
initial state leads to higher expected decisions if the policy function is increasing in the
state of the system and the transition probability function is monotone. The proof follows
from the same arguments as those in the proof of Corollary 1. Recall that we denote the
initial state by s(1).
10A similar result to Theorem 1 for the case of st and ICX can be found in Huggett (2004),
Adlakha and Johari (2013), Balbus et al. (2014), and Acemoglu and Jensen (2015).
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Corollary 2 Consider two MDPs that are equivalent except for the initial states si(1),
i = 1, 2. Assume that s2(1) ≥ s1(1), g(s) is increasing in s, and p is monotone. Then
E
t
2(g(s2(1))) ≥ E
t
1(g(s1(1))) for all t ∈ N.
We now derive stochastic comparative statics results with respect to the transition
probability function that governs the states’ dynamics. Part (i) of Theorem 2 provides
conditions that ensure that p2 st p1 implies E
t
2(g(p2)) ≥ E
t
1(g(p1)) for all t ∈ N. Part
(ii) provides conditions that ensure that p2 CX p1 implies E
t
2(g(p2)) ≥ E
t
1(g(p1)) for
all t ∈ N. In Section 4 we apply these results to various commonly studied dynamic
optimization models.
Theorem 2 Let p1, p2 ∈ Ep.
(i) Assume that p2 is monotone, g(s, p2) is increasing in s, and g(s, p2) ≥ g(s, p1) for
all s ∈ S. Then p2 st p1 implies that E
t
2(g(p2)) ≥ E
t
1(g(p1)) for all t ∈ N.
(ii) Assume that p2 is monotone and convexity-preserving, g(s, p2) is increasing and
convex in s, and g(s, p2) ≥ g(s, p1) for all s ∈ S. Then p2 CX p1 implies that E
t
2(g(p2)) ≥
E
t
1(g(p1)) for all t ∈ N.
3.2 A change in the discount factor or in the payoff function
In this section we provide sufficient conditions for the monotonicity of the policy function
in the state variable, and for the monotonicity of the policy function in other parameters
of the MDP, including the discount factor and the parameters that influence the single-
period payoff function. Our stochastic comparative statics results in Section 3.1 rely on
these monotonicity properties. Thus, we provide conditions on the model’s primitives
that ensure stochastic comparative statics results.
The monotonicity of the policy function in the state variable follows from the condi-
tions on the model’s primitives provided in Topkis (2011). We note that these conditions
are not necessary for deriving monotonicity results regarding the policy function, and in
some specific applications one can still derive these monotonicity results using different
techniques or under different assumptions.11
Recall that a function f : S ×E → R is said to have increasing differences in (s, e) on
11 For example, see Lovejoy (1987) and Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992). See also
Smith and McCardle (2002) for conditions that guarantee that the value function is monotone and
has increasing differences.
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S × E if for all e2, e1 ∈ E and s2, s1 ∈ S such that e2  e1 and s2 ≥ s1, we have
f(s2, e2)− f(s2, e1) ≥ f(s1, e2)− f(s1, e1).
A function f has decreasing differences if −f has increasing differences.
A set B ∈ B(S) is called an upper set if s1 ∈ B and s2 ≥ s1 imply s2 ∈ B. The transi-
tion probability p ∈ Ep has stochastically increasing differences if p(s, a, B) has increasing
differences for every upper set B. See Topkis (2011) for examples of transition probabili-
ties that have stochastically increasing differences. The optimal policy correspondence G
is said to be ascending if s2 ≥ s1, b ∈ G(s1), and b
′ ∈ G(s2) imply max{b, b
′} ∈ G(s2)
and min{b, b′} ∈ G(s1). In particular, if G is ascending, then minG(s) and maxG(s)
are increasing functions. Topkis (2011) provides conditions under which the optimal pol-
icy correspondence G is ascending. These conditions are summarized in the following
assumption:
Assumption 1 (i) r(s, a) is increasing in s and has increasing differences.
(ii) p is monotone and has stochastically increasing differences.
(iii) For all s1, s2 ∈ S, s1 ≤ s2 implies Γ(s1) ⊆ Γ(s2).
Theorem 3 shows that under Assumption 1, the policy function g(s, β) is increasing
in the discount factor. Furthermore, if the single period payoff function r(s, a, c) depends
on some parameter c and has increasing differences, then the policy function is increasing
in the parameter c.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that Γ(s) is ascending.
(i) Let 0 < β1 ≤ β2 < 1. Then g(s, β2) ≥ g(s, β1) for all s ∈ S and E
t
2(g(β2)) ≥
E
t
1(g(β1)) for all t ∈ N.
(ii) Let c ∈ E be a parameter that influences the payoff function. If the payoff function
r(s, a, c) has increasing differences in (a, c) and in (s, c), then g(s, c2) ≥ g(s, c1) for all
s ∈ S, and Et2(g(c2)) ≥ E
t
1(g(c1)) for all t ∈ N whenever c2  c1.
3.3 A change in the transition probability function
In this section we study stochastic comparative statics results related to a change in
the transition function. We provide conditions on the transition function and on the
payoff function that ensure that p2 st p1 implies comparative statics results and stochas-
tic comparative statics results. We assume that the transition function pi is given by
11
pi(s, a, B) = Pr(m(s, a, ǫ) ∈ B) for all B ∈ B(S), where ǫ is a random variable with law v
and support V ⊆ Rk. Theorem 4 provides conditions on the function m that imply that
the policy function is higher when v is higher in the sense of stochastic dominance. In
Section 4.3, we provide an example of a controlled random walk where the conditions on
m are satisfied.
Theorem 4 Suppose that pi(s, a, B) = Pr(m(s, a, ǫi) ∈ B) where m is convex, increasing,
continuous, and has increasing differences in (s, a), (s, ǫ) and (a, ǫ); and ǫi has the law
vi, i = 1, 2. r(s, a) is convex and increasing in s and has increasing differences. For all
s1, s2 ∈ S, we have Γ(s1) = Γ(s2).
If v2 st v1 then
(i) g(s, p2) ≥ g(s, p1) for all s ∈ S and g(s, p2) is increasing in s.
(ii) Et2(g(p2)) ≥ E
t
1(g(p1)) for all t ∈ N.
4 Applications
In this section we apply our results to several dynamic optimization models from the
economics and operations research literature.
4.1 Capital accumulation with adjustment costs
Capital accumulation models are widely studied in the investment theory literature (Stokey and Lucas,
1989). We consider a standard capital accumulation model with adjustment costs (Hopenhayn and Prescott,
1992). In this model, a firm maximizes its expected discounted profit over an infinite hori-
zon. The single-period revenues depend on the demand and on the firm’s capital. The
demand evolves exogenously in a Markovian fashion. In each period, the firm decides on
the next period’s capital level and incurs an adjustment cost that depends on the current
capital level and on the next period’s capital level. Using the stochastic comparative stat-
ics results developed in the previous section, we find conditions that ensure that higher
future demand, in the sense of first order stochastic dominance, increases the expected
long run capital accumulated. We provide the details below.
Consider a firm that maximizes its expected discounted profit. The firm’s single-period
payoff function r is given by
r(s, a) = R(s1, s2)− c(s1, a)
12
where s = (s1, s2). The revenue function R depends on an exogenous demand shock
s2 ∈ S2 ⊆ R
n−1, and on the current firm’s capital stock s1 ∈ S1 ⊆ R+. The state space
is given by S = S1 × S2. The demand shocks follow a Markov process with a transition
function Q. The firm chooses the next period’s capital stock a ∈ Γ(s1) and incurs an
adjustment cost of c(s1, a). The transition probability function p is given by
p(s, a, B) = 1D(a)Q(s2, C),
where D×C = B, D is a measurable set in R, C is a measurable set in Rn−1, and Q is a
Markov kernel on S2 ⊆ R
n−1.
It is easy to see that if Q is monotone then p(s, a, B) = 1D(a)Q(s2, C) is monotone
and that Q2 st Q1 implies p2 st p1.
Assume that the revenue function R is continuous and has increasing differences,
that c is continuous and has decreasing differences, and that Γ(s) is ascending. Under
these conditions, Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) show that the policy function g(s, p) is
increasing in s if Q is monotone. If, in addition, Q2 st Q1, then g(s, p2) ≥ g(s, p1) for
all s (see Corollary 7 in Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992)). Thus, part (i) in Theorem 2
implies that Et2(g(p2)) ≥ E
t
1(g(p1)) for all t ∈ N.
Proposition 1 Let Q1 and Q2 be two Markov kernels on S2. Assume that R is continuous
and has increasing differences, c is continuous and has decreasing differences, Γ(s) is
ascending, and Γ(s1) ⊇ Γ(s
′
1) whenever s1 ≥ s
′
1. Assume that Q2 is monotone and that
Q2 st Q1. Then under Q2 the expected capital accumulation is higher than under Q1,
i.e., Et2(g(p2)) ≥ E
t
1(g(p1)) for all t ∈ N.
4.2 Dynamic pricing with a reference effect and an uncertain
memory factor
In this section we consider a dynamic pricing model with a reference effect as in Popescu and Wu
(2007). In this model the demand is sensitive to the firm’s pricing history. In particular,
consumers form a reference price that influences their demand. As in Popescu and Wu
(2007), we consider a profit-maximizing monopolist who faces a homogeneous stream of
repeated customers over an infinite time horizon. In each period, the monopolist decides
on a price a ∈ A := [0, a] to charge the consumers. Assume for simplicity that the
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marginal cost is 0. The resulting single-period payoff function is given by
r(s, a) = aD(s, a)
where s ∈ S ⊆ R is the current reference price and D(s, a) is the demand function that
depends on the reference price s and on the price that the monopoly charges a. We assume
that the function D(s, a) is continuous, non-negative, decreasing in p, increasing in s, has
increasing differences, and is convex in s. If the current reference price is s and the firm
sets a price of a then the next period’s reference price is given by γs + (1 − γ)a (see
Popescu and Wu (2007) for details on the micro foundations of this structure). γ is called
the memory factor. In contrast to the model of Popescu and Wu (2007), we assume that
the memory factor γ is not deterministic. More precisely, we assume that the memory
factor γ is a random variable on [0, 1] with law v. So the transition probability function
p is given by
p(s, a, B) = v{γ ∈ [0, 1] : (γs+ (1− γ)a) ∈ B}
for all B ∈ B(S). We show that even when the memory factor γ is a random variable, the
result of Popescu and Wu (2007) holds in expectation, i.e., the long run expected prices
are increasing in the current reference price. We also show that an increase in the discount
factor increases the current optimal price and the long run expected prices.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the function D(s, a) is continuous, non-negative, decreasing
in p, increasing and convex in s, and has increasing differences.
(i) The optimal pricing policy g(s) is increasing in the reference price s.
(ii) The expected optimal prices in each period are higher when the initial reference
price is higher.
(iii) 0 < β1 ≤ β2 < 1 implies that g(s, β2) ≥ g(s, β1) for all s ∈ S and E
t
2(g(β2)) ≥
E
t
1(g(β1)) for all t ∈ N.
4.3 Controlled random walks
Controlled random walks are used to study controlled queueing systems and other phe-
nomena in applied probability (for example, see Serfozo (1981)). In this section we con-
sider a simple controlled random walk on R. At any period, the state of the system
s ∈ R determines the current period’s reward c1(s). The next period’s state is given by
m(s, a, ǫ) = a + s + ǫ where ǫ is a random variable with law v and support V ⊆ R, and
a ∈ A is the action that the DM chooses. Thus, the process evolves as a random walk
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s + ǫ plus the DM’s action a. When the DM chooses an action a ∈ A, a cost of c2(a)
is incurred. We assume that A ⊆ R is a compact set, c1(s) is an increasing and convex
function, and c2 is an increasing function. That is, the reward and the marginal reward
are increasing in the state of the system and the costs are increasing in the action that
the DM chooses.
The single-period payoff function is given by r(s, a) = c1(s)− c2(a) and the transition
probability function is given by
p(s, a, B) = v{ǫ ∈ V : a+ s+ ǫ ∈ B}
for all B ∈ B(R). In this setting, when choosing an action a, the DM faces the following
trade-off between the current payoff and future payoffs: while choosing a higher action a
has higher current costs, it increases the probability that the state of the system will be
higher in the next period, and thus, a higher action increases the probability of higher
future rewards.
We study how a change in the random variable ǫ affects the DM’s current and future
optimal decisions. When c1(s) is convex and increasing in s, it is easy to see that the
transition function m(s, a, ǫ) = a + s+ ǫ and the single-period function r(s, a) = c1(s)−
c2(a) satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4. Thus, the proof of the following proposition
follows immediately from Theorem 4.
Proposition 3 Suppose that pi(s, a, B) = Pr(a + s + ǫi ∈ B) where ǫi has the law vi,
i = 1, 2. Suppose that c1(s) is convex and increasing in s. Assume that v2 st v1.
Then g(s, p2) ≥ g(s, p1) for all s ∈ S, g(s, p2) is increasing in s, and E
t
2(g(p2)) ≥
E
t
1(g(p1)) for all t ∈ N.
4.4 Comparisons of stationary distributions
Stationary equilibrium is the preferred solution concept for many models that describe
large dynamic economies (see Acemoglu and Jensen (2015) for examples of such models).
In these models, there is a continuum of agents. Each agent has an individual state
and solves a discounted dynamic programming problem given some parameters e (usually
prices). The parameters are determined by the aggregate decisions of all agents. Infor-
mally, a stationary equilibrium of these models consists of a set of parameters e, a policy
function g, and a probability measure λ on S such that (i) g is an optimal stationary
policy given the parameters e, (ii) λ is a stationary distribution of the states’ dynamics
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P (s, B) given the parameters e, and (iii) the parameters e are determined as a function
of λ and g.12
The existence and uniqueness of a stationary probability measure λ on S in the sense
that
λ(B) =
∫
S
p(s, g(s), B)λ(ds)
for all B ∈ B(S) are widely studied.13 We now derive comparative statics results relating
to how the stationary distribution λ changes when the transition function p changes. We
denote the least stationary distribution by λ and the greatest stationary distribution by
λ.
Proposition 4 Suppose that S is a compact set in R.
(i) Let Ep,i be the set of all monotone transition probability functions p. Assume that
g(s, p) is increasing in (s, p) on S × Ep,i where Ep,i is endowed with the order st. Then
the greatest stationary distribution λ and the least stationary distributions λ are increasing
in p on Ep,i with respect to st.
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(ii) Let Ep,ic be the set of all monotone and convexity-preserving transition probability
functions p. Assume that g(s, p) is convex in s and is increasing in (s, p) on S × Ep,ic
where Ep,ic is endowed with the order CX . Then the greatest stationary distribution λ
and the least stationary distributions λ are increasing in p on Ep,ic with respect to ICX .
We apply Proposition 4 to a standard stationary equilibrium model (Huggett, 1993).
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical agents with mass 1. The agents solve a
consumption-savings problem when their income is fluctuating. Each agent’s payoff func-
tion is given by r(s, a) = u(s− a) where s denotes the agent’s current wealth, a denotes
the agent’s savings, s − a is the agent’s current consumption, and u is the agent’s util-
ity function. Thus, when an agent consumes s − a, his single-period payoff is given by
u(s− a).15 Recall that a utility function is in the class of hyperbolic absolute risk aver-
sion (HARA) utility functions if its absolute risk aversion A (c) is hyperbolic. That is, if
12 Stationary equilibrium models are used to study a wide range of economic phenomena. Exam-
ples include models of industry equilibrium (Hopenhayn, 1992), heterogeneous agent macro models
(Huggett, 1993) and (Aiyagari, 1994), and many more.
13 For example, see Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992), Kamihigashi and Stachurski (2014), and
Foss et al. (2018).
14 The existence of the greatest fixed point is guaranteed from the Tarski fixed-point theorem. For
more details, see the Appendix and Topkis (2011).
15For simplicity we assume that all the agents are ex-ante identical, i.e., the agents have the same
utility function and transition function. The model can be extended to the case of ex-ante heterogene-
ity.
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A(c) := −u
′′(c)
u′(c)
= 1
ac+b
for c > −b
a
. We assume that u is in the HARA class and that the
utility function’s derivative u′ is convex.
Savings are limited to a single risk-free bond. When the agents save an amount a their
next period’s wealth is given by Ra+ y where R is the risk-free bond’s rate of return and
y ∈ Y = [y, y] ⊂ R+ is the agents’ labor income in the next period. The agents’ labor
income is a random variable with law ν. Thus, the transition function is given by
p(s, a, B) = ν{y ∈ Y : Ra + y ∈ B}.
The set from which the agents can choose their savings level is given by Γ(s) =
[s,min{s, s}] where s < 0 is a borrowing limit and s > 0 is an upper bound on savings.
A stationary equilibrium is given by a probability measure λ on S = [s, (1 + r)s+ y],
a rate of return R, and a stationary savings policy function g such that (i) g is optimal
given R, (ii) λ is a stationary distribution given R, i.e., λ(B) =
∫
S
p(s, g(s), B)λ(ds), and
(iii) markets clear in the sense that the total supply of savings equals the total demand
for savings, i.e.,
∫
g(s)λ(ds) = 0.
If the agents’ utility function is in the HARA class then the savings policy function
g(s) is convex and increasing (see Jensen (2017)). It is easy to see that p is convexity-
preserving and monotone. Furthermore, when u′ is convex then the policy function g(s, p)
is increasing in p with respect to the convex order, i.e., g(s, p2) ≥ g(s, p1) whenever
p2 CX p1 (see Light (2018a)). Thus, part (ii) of Proposition 4 implies that when the
labor income uncertainty increases (i.e., p2 CX p1), both the highest partial equilibrium
(when R is fixed) wealth inequality and the lowest partial equilibrium wealth inequality
increase (i.e., λ2 ICX λ1).
5 Summary
This paper studies how the current and future optimal decisions change as a function of
the optimization problem’s parameters in the context of Markov decision processes. We
provide simple sufficient conditions on the primitives of Markov decision processes that
ensure comparative statics results and stochastic comparative statics results. We show
that various models from different areas of operations research and economics satisfy our
sufficient conditions.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs of the results in Section 3.1
Proof of Theorem 1. For t = 1 the result is trivial since µ12 = µ
1
1. Assume that
µt2 D µ
t
1 for some t ∈ N. First note that for every measurable function f : S → R and
i = 1, 2 we have ∫
S
f(s′)µt+1i (ds
′) =
∫
S
∫
S
f(s′)Pi(s, ds
′)µti(ds). (2)
To see this, assume first that f = 1B where B ∈ B(S) and 1 is the indicator function of
the set B. We have
∫
S
f(s′)µt+1i (ds
′) = µt+1i (B)
=
∫
S
pi(s, g(s, ei), B)µ
t
i(ds)
=
∫
S
∫
S
1B(s
′)pi(s, g(s, ei), ds
′)µti(ds)
=
∫
S
∫
S
f(s′)Pi(s, ds
′)µti(ds).
A standard argument shows that equality (2) holds for every measurable function f .
Now assume that f ∈ D. We have
∫
S
f(s′)µt+12 (ds
′) =
∫
S
∫
S
f(s′)P2(s, ds
′)µt2(ds)
≥
∫
S
∫
S
f(s′)P2(s, ds
′)µt1(ds)
≥
∫
S
∫
S
f(s′)P1(s, ds
′)µt1(ds)
=
∫
S
f(s′)µt+11 (ds
′).
The first inequality follows since f ∈ D, P2 is D-preserving and µ
t
2 D µ
t
1 . The second
inequality follows since P2(s, ·) D P1(s, ·). Thus, µ
t+1
2 D µ
t+1
1 . We conclude that
µt2 D µ
t
1 for all t ∈ N.
Proof of Corollary 1. We show that P2 is I-preserving and that P2(s, ·) st P1(s, ·)
for all s ∈ S. Let f : S → R be an increasing function and let e2  e1.
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Since p is monotone and g(s, e2) is increasing in s, if s2 ≥ s1 then
∫
S
f(s′)p(s2, g(s2, e2), ds
′) ≥
∫
S
f(s′)p(s1, g(s1, e2), ds
′).
Thus, P2 is I-preserving.
Let s ∈ S. Since g(s, e2) ≥ g(s, e1) and p is monotone, we have
∫
S
f(s′)p(s, g(s, e2), ds
′) ≥
∫
S
f(s′)p(s, g(s, e1), ds
′).
Thus, P2(s, ·) st P1(s, ·).
From Theorem 1 we conclude that µt2 st µ
t
1 for all t ∈ N. We have
∫
S
g(s, e2)µ
t
2(ds) ≥
∫
S
g(s, e2)µ
t
1(ds) ≥
∫
S
g(s, e1)µ
t
1(ds),
which proves the Corollary.
Proof of Theorem 2. (i) Assume that p2 st p1. We show that P2 is I-preserving and
that P2(s, ·) st P1(s, ·) for all s ∈ S. Let f : S → R be an increasing function.
Assume that s2 ≥ s1. Since g(s2, p2) ≥ g(s1, p2) and p2 is monotone we have
∫
S
f(s′)p2(s2, g(s2, p2), ds
′) ≥
∫
S
f(s′)p2(s1, g(s1, p2), ds
′),
which proves that P2 is I-preserving.
Let s ∈ S. Since p2 is monotone, g(s, p2) ≥ g(s, p1) for all s ∈ S, and p2 st p1 we
have
∫
S
f(s′)p2(s, g(s, p2), s, ds
′) ≥
∫
S
f(s′)p2(s, g(s, p1), ds
′)
≥
∫
S
f(s′)p1(s, g(s, p1), ds
′),
which proves that P2(s, ·) st P1(s, ·) for all s ∈ S.
From Theorem 1 we conclude that µt2 st µ
t
1 for all t ∈ N. Since g(s, p2) is increasing,
we have ∫
S
g(s, p2)µ
t
2(ds) ≥
∫
S
g(s, p2)µ
t
1(ds) ≥
∫
g(s, p1)µ
t
1(ds),
which proves part (i).
(ii) Assume that p2 CX p1. We show that P2 is ICX-preserving and that P2(s, ·) ICX
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P1(s, ·) for all s ∈ S.
Let f : S → R be an increasing and convex function. Let s1, s2 ∈ S and sλ =
λs1 + (1− λ)s2 for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. We have
λ
∫
S
f(s′)p2(s1, g(s1, p2), ds
′) + (1− λ)
∫
S
f(s′)p2(s2, g(s2, p2), ds
′)
≥
∫
S
f(s′)p2(sλ, λg(s1, p2) + (1− λ)g(s2, p2), ds
′)
≥
∫
S
f(s′)p2(sλ, g(sλ, p2), ds
′).
The first inequality follows since p2 is convexity-preserving. The second inequality follows
since g(s, p2) is convex and p2 is monotone. Thus,
∫
S
f(s′)P2(s, ds
′) is convex. Part (i)
shows that
∫
S
f(s′)P2(s, ds
′) is increasing. We conclude that P2 is ICX-preserving.
Fix s ∈ S. We have
∫
S
f(s′)p2(s, g(s, p2), ds
′) ≥
∫
S
f(s′)p2(s, g(s, p1), ds
′)
≥
∫
S
f(s′)p1(s, g(s, p1), ds
′).
The first inequality follows since g(s, p2) ≥ g(s, p1) and p2 is monotone. The second
inequality follows since p2 CX p1. We conclude that P2(s, ·) ICX P1(s, ·).
From Theorem 1 we conclude that µt2 ICX µ
t
1 for all t ∈ N. Since g(s, p2) is increasing
and convex, we have
∫
S
g(s, p2)µ
t
2(ds) ≥
∫
S
g(s, p2)µ
t
1(ds) ≥
∫
g(s, p1)µ
t
1(ds),
which proves part (ii).
6.2 Proofs of the results in Section 3.2
In order to prove Theorem 3 we need the following two results:
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then
(i) h(s, a, f) has increasing differences whenever f is an increasing function.
(ii) G(s) is ascending. In particular, g(s) = maxG(s) is an increasing function.
(iii) Tf(s) = maxa∈Γ(s) h(s, a, f) is an increasing function whenever f is an increasing
function. V (s) is an increasing function.
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Proof. See Theorem 3.9.2 in Topkis (2011).
Proposition 6 Let (E,) be a partially ordered set. Assume that Γ(s) is ascending. If
h(s, a, e, f) has increasing differences in (s, a), (s, e), and (a, e), then
Tf(s, e) = max
a∈Γ(s)
h(s, a, e, f)
has increasing differences in (s, e).
Proof. See Lemma 1 in Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) or Lemma 2 in Lovejoy (1987).
Proof of Theorem 3. (i) Let E = (0, 1) be the set of all possible discount factors,
endowed with the standard order: β2 ≥ β1 if β2 is greater than or equal to β1. Assume
that β1 ≤ β2. Let f ∈ B(S × E) and assume that f has increasing differences in (s, β)
and is increasing in s. Let a2 ≥ a1. Since f has increasing differences, the function
f(s, β2)− f(s, β1) is increasing in s. Since p is monotone we have
∫
S
(f(s′, β2)− f(s
′, β1))p(s, a2, ds
′) ≥
∫
S
(f(s′, β2)− f(s
′, β1))p(s, a1, ds
′).
Rearranging the last inequality yields
∫
S
f(s′, β2)p(s, a2, ds
′)−
∫
S
f(s′, β2)p(s, a1, ds
′) ≥
∫
S
f(s′, β1)p(s, a2, ds
′)−
∫
S
f(s′, β1)p(s, a1, ds
′).
Since f is increasing in s and p is monotone, the right-hand-side and the left-hand-
side of the last inequality are nonnegative. Thus, multiplying the left-hand-side of the
last inequality by β2 and the right-hand-side of the last inequality by β1 preserves the
inequality. Adding to each side of the last inequality r(a2, s)− r(a1, s) yields
h(s, a2, β2, f)− h(s, a1, β2, f) ≥ h(s, a2, β1, f)− h(s, a1, β1, f).
That is, h has increasing differences in (a, β). An analogous argument shows that h has
increasing differences in (s, β). Proposition 5 guarantees that h has increasing differences
in (s, a) and that Tf is increasing in s.
Proposition 6 implies that Tf has increasing differences. We conclude that for all n =
1, 2, 3...., T nf has increasing differences and is increasing in s. From standard dynamic
programming arguments, T nf converges uniformly to V . Since the set of functions that
has increasing differences and is increasing in s is closed under uniform convergence, V
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has increasing differences and is increasing in s. From the same argument as above,
h(s, a, β, V ) has increasing differences in (a, β). Theorem 6.1 in Topkis (1978) implies
that g(s, β) is increasing in β for all s ∈ S. Proposition 5 implies that g(s, β) is increasing
in s for all β ∈ E. We now apply Corollary 1 to conclude that Et2(g(β2)) ≥ E
t
1(g(β1)) for
all t ∈ N.
(ii) The proof is similar to the proof of part (i) and is therefore omitted.
6.3 Proofs of the results in Section 3.3
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose that the function f ∈ B(S×Ep) is convex and increasing
in s, and has increasing differences where Ep is endowed with the stochastic dominance
order st. Let v2 st v1.
Note that m has increasing differences in (s, a), (s, ǫ) and (a, ǫ) if and only if m is
supermodular (see Theorem 3.2 in Topkis (1978)).
From the fact that the composition of a convex and increasing function with a convex,
increasing and supermodular function is convex and supermodular (see Topkis (2011)) the
function f(m(s, a, ǫ), p2) is convex and supermodular in (s, a) for all ǫ ∈ V. Since convexity
and supermodularity are preserved under integration, the function
∫
f(m(s, a, ǫ), p2)v2(dǫ)
is convex and supermodular in (s, a). Thus,
h(s, a, p2, f) = r(s, a) + β
∫
V
f(m(s, a, ǫ), p2)v2(dǫ) (3)
is convex and supermodular in (s, a) as the sum of convex and supermodular functions.
This implies that Tf(s, p2) = maxa∈Γ(s) h(s, a, p2, f) is convex. Since h is increasing in s
it follows that Tf(s, p2) is increasing in s.
Note that for any increasing function f : S → R we have
∫
S
f(s′)p2(s, a, ds
′) =
∫
V
f(m(s, a, ǫ))v2(dǫ) ≥
∫
V
f(m(s, a, ǫ))v1(dǫ) =
∫
S
f(s′)p1(s, a, ds
′),
so p2 st p1.
Fix a ∈ A, and let s2 ≥ s1. Since f(m(s, a, ǫ), p2) is supermodular in (s, ǫ), the
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function f(m(s2, a, ǫ), p2)− f(m(s1, a, ǫ), p2) is increasing in ǫ. We have
∫
V
(f(m(s2, a, ǫ), p2)− f(m(s1, a, ǫ), p2))v2(dǫ) ≥
∫
V
(f(m(s2, a, ǫ), p2)− f(m(s1, a, ǫ), p2))v1(dǫ)
≥
∫
V
(f(m(s2, a, ǫ), p1)− f(m(s1, a, ǫ), p1))v1(dǫ).
The first inequality follows since v2 st v1. The second inequality follows from the facts
that m is increasing in s and f has increasing differences. Adding r(s2, a) − r(s1, a) to
each side of the last inequality implies that h has increasing differences in (s, p). Similarly,
we can show that h has increasing differences in (a, p).
Proposition 6 implies that Tf has increasing differences. We conclude that for all
n = 1, 2, 3...., T nf is convex and increasing in s and has increasing differences. From
standard dynamic programming arguments, T nf converges uniformly to V . Since the set
of functions that have increasing differences and are convex and increasing in s is closed
under uniform convergence, V has increasing differences and is convex and increasing in
s. From the same argument as above, h(s, a, p, V ) has increasing differences in (a, p) and
(s, a). An application of Theorem 6.1 in Topkis (1978) implies that g(s, p2) ≥ g(s, p1)
for all s ∈ S and g(s, p2) is increasing in s. The fact that m is increasing implies that p
is monotone. We now apply Corollary 1 to conclude that Et2(g(p2)) ≥ E
t
1(g(p1)) for all
t ∈ N.
6.4 Proofs of the results in Sections 4.2 and 4.4
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Let f ∈ B(S) be a convex function. The facts that D(s, a)
is convex in s and that convexity is preserved under integration imply that the function
aD(s, a) + β
∫
f(γs+ (1− γ)a)v(dγ) is convex in s. Thus, the function Tf(s) given by
Tf(s) = max
a∈A
aD(s, a) + β
∫
f(γs+ (1− γ)a)v(dγ)
is convex in s. A standard dynamic programming argument (see the proof of Proposition
3) shows that the value function V is convex. The convexity of V implies that for all γ, the
function V (γs+ (1− γ)a) has increasing differences in (s, a). Since increasing differences
are preserved under integration,
∫ 1
0
V (γs + (1 − γ)a)v(dγ) has increasing differences in
(s, a). Since D(s, a) is nonnegative and has increasing differences, the function aD(s, a)
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has increasing differences. Thus, the function
aD(s, a) + β
∫ 1
0
V (γs+ (1− γ)a)v(dγ)
has increasing differences as the sum of functions with increasing differences. Now apply
Theorem 6.1 in Topkis (1978) to conclude that g(s) is increasing.
(ii) Follows from Corollary 1.
(iii) Follows from a similar argument to the arguments in the proof of Theorem 3.
We now introduce some notations and a result that is needed in order to prove Propo-
sition 4. Recall that a partially ordered set (Z,≥) is said to be a lattice if for all x, y ∈ Z,
sup{x, y} and inf{y, x} exist in Z. (Z,≥) is a complete lattice if for all non-empty sub-
sets Z ′ ⊆ Z the elements supZ ′ and inf Z ′ exist in Z. We need the following Proposition
regarding the comparison of fixed points. For a proof, see Corollary 2.5.2 in Topkis (2011).
Proposition 7 Suppose that Z is a nonempty complete lattice, E is a partially ordered
set, and f(z, e) is an increasing function from Z ×E into Z. Then the greatest and least
fixed points of f(z, e) exist and are increasing in e on E.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let P(S) be the set of all probability measures on S. The
partially ordered set (P(S),st) and the partially ordered set (P(S),ICX) are complete
lattices when S ⊆ R is compact (see Mu¨ller and Scarsini (2006)).
(i) Define the operator Φ : P(S)× Ep,i → P(S) by
Φ(λ, p)(·) =
∫
S
p(s, g(s, p), ·)λ(ds).
The proof of Theorem 2 implies that Φ is an increasing function on P(S) × Ep,i with
respect to st. That is, for p1, p2 ∈ Ep,i and λ1, λ2 ∈ P(S) we have Φ(λ2, p2) st Φ(λ1, p1)
whenever p2 st p1 and λ2 st λ1. Proposition 7 implies the result.
(ii) The proof is analogous to the proof of part (i) and is therefore omitted.
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